
"Bypassing" the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi oil exports "have recovered by more than half," but can this "Plan B" be sustained?
Against the backdrop of the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia has restored oil exports to 60% of pre-war levels by activating the "East-West Pipeline" and using drag-reducing agent technology, reaching an average of 4.19 million barrels per day, becoming a key buffer in the global energy market. However, this move has shifted the export risk from Hormuz to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which is threatened by Houthi armed groups. While this "detour" alleviates immediate concerns, it has once again entangled Saudi oil in a new geopolitical chokehold
After the Strait of Hormuz was nearly closed, Saudi Arabia has restored its oil export volume to over 60% of pre-war levels through a 45-year-old pipeline that crosses the desert, providing a crucial buffer for what the International Energy Agency (IEA) calls "the largest supply disruption in oil market history." However, this detour is not a safe passage; it merely shifts the risk from one chokepoint to another.
According to ship tracking data compiled by Bloomberg, in the past five days, the average daily crude oil export volume from Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port of Yanbu has reached approximately 4.19 million barrels, which is about 60% of Saudi Arabia's pre-war average daily export total of around 7 million barrels. This marks a significant increase from the port's pre-war level of about 1.4 million barrels per day, with daily peaks reaching 4.65 million barrels on three occasions. According to Reuters, citing LSEG shipping data, Yanbu's loading capacity is expected to rise to a record 3.8 million barrels per day in March, with at least 32 supertankers and Suezmax tankers currently waiting offshore near Yanbu to load, and more vessels still en route.
Saudi Arabia is the only major oil-producing country in the Gulf with a substantial alternative export route. Its East-West Pipeline has a maximum capacity of 7 million barrels per day, allowing it to maintain relatively independent exports even as neighboring countries like Iraq and Kuwait are forced to significantly cut production. Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser confirmed in early March that the pipeline would reach full capacity within a few days.
The core risk of this "Plan B" lies in the fact that it shifts the geopolitical exposure of oil exports from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab al-Mandab Strait—this narrow waterway at the southern end of the Red Sea, most of whose coastline on the Yemeni side is controlled by Houthi forces. Analysts warn that if the Houthis intervene in the current conflict and disrupt Yanbu port or the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the global energy market could come under pressure again.
Pipeline Acceleration: Chemicals Aid "Extreme Sprint"
The alternative route invoked by Saudi Arabia is an east-west oil pipeline built in 1981, originally intended to provide a backup route for exports during the "tanker war" of the Iran-Iraq War—decision-makers focused on providing an alternative route in case the situation in Hormuz spiraled out of control. This approximately 1,200-kilometer pipeline crosses the desert and ends at the Red Sea port of Yanbu, with a total transportation capacity of 7 million barrels per day, of which about 5 million barrels per day can be used for exports, while the remainder supplies domestic refineries.
To quickly break through physical limits, Aramco has taken additional measures. According to Reuters, citing two industry sources, Aramco is injecting a chemical known as a "drag-reducing agent" (DRA) into the pipeline—this technology can reduce fluid friction resistance within the pipeline and increase flow rates by over 30%, having been widely used by European operators in response to the impact of Russian oil sanctions. Sources indicate that Saudi Arabia currently has ample reserves of this chemical
Export Surge: Saudi Arabia Dominates the "Alternative Route"
According to the latest data, the preliminary effects of this detour route are already evident. According to Bloomberg shipping tracking data, the export volume from Yanbu has shown a steady upward trend since the outbreak of the conflict, with the average daily level in March significantly increasing from 1.3 million barrels in January and 1.4 million barrels in February; about 70 oil tankers are expected to complete loading in Yanbu this month, with approximately 40 still en route.
In contrast, other Gulf oil-producing countries are in a more passive position. The UAE has a pipeline leading to the Gulf of Oman, but its terminal at Fujairah has been forced to halt loading and unloading operations multiple times due to drone attacks, affecting the stability of the route. Iraq and Kuwait have almost no alternative routes and have been forced to cut production successively. The International Energy Agency has characterized this conflict as the largest supply disruption event in the history of the oil market, while Saudi Arabia's pipeline has now become the most important single infrastructure supporting the global energy market.
New Throat: Geopolitical Risks of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait
The east-west pipeline successfully bypasses Hormuz but brings the export route into another geopolitically sensitive area.
About 90% of the crude oil departing from Yanbu is loaded onto Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). These tankers, when fully loaded, cannot pass through the Suez Canal due to their deep draft and must navigate south through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to reach Asia and other major markets. Analysts estimate that about 70% to 75% of the crude oil exported from Yanbu is potentially exposed to risks in the direction of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), approximately 6% of the world's seaborne oil passes through this waterway.
Gregory Brew, a senior analyst at Eurasia Group and an expert on Iranian oil history, stated, "The threat from the Houthis is real." "If they attack Yanbu and cause significant damage, you would face a disruption of 7 million barrels of exports per day," he said.
Some of the export volume can bypass the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait via another route—heading north from Yanbu to transport crude oil to Ain Sukhna port in Egypt, and then transferring through the Sumed pipeline to the Mediterranean. Analysts estimate that this route can handle about 2 to 2.5 million barrels per day, but this capacity is far from sufficient to absorb all of Yanbu's exports. Currently, according to the latest data from the Western Naval Information Center (JMIC), the vessel traffic in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb Strait has returned to historical normal levels, with about 40 vessels passing through in the past 24 hours, and no new security incidents reported.
Houthis: Strategic Restraint or Standby Intervention
The Houthis have not officially announced their involvement in the current conflict, but their leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi clearly stated in a television speech on March 5, "Regarding military escalation and action, our fingers are always on the trigger, ready to act when the situation demands."
Opinions vary among analysts regarding why the Houthis have not yet taken action. Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst on Yemen issues at the International Crisis Group, believes this is a strategically calculated restraint rather than a lack of capability "Iran seems to be gradually managing the situation, using the Houthis as a reserve force," Nagi said. "In this sense, the Houthis are an important card that can be played later, especially considering their ability to disrupt Red Sea shipping and create broader economic and security pressures." He added, "Their current restraint appears more like a choice of timing rather than a reluctance to engage in combat."
Gregory Brew provided another layer of consideration from the perspective of the Houthis' own situation: after enduring strikes from both the U.S. and Israel, the military strength of the Houthis has been significantly depleted, and their internal finances are under pressure. "I believe their current financial and military situation will suppress their willingness to launch large-scale hostilities," he said.
Both assessments point to the same reality: for the global energy market, the stability of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is increasingly becoming a key variable in whether Saudi Arabia's oil "Plan B" can continue to operate—and this is precisely something Riyadh cannot control alone
